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NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
seem persuasive enough to justify denying a child recovery for an in-
jury willfully and maliciously inflicted upon him by his parent.
The North Carolina Supreme Court adopted the general rule of
nonliability in Small v. Morrison,19 a negligence case, notwithstanding
the vigorous dissent of Chief Justice Clark, which closely parallels the
opinion of the majority of the court in the Oregon case.20 However,
the question as to whether an unemancipated minor may sue his parent
for a willful or malicious tort does not seem to have been yet presented
in this state. The Oregon court, by refusing to apply a hard and fast
rule of nonliability to the facts in this case, has recognized a trend
which the North Carolina court should seriously consider when the
question is presented in this state.
EARL W. VAUGHN.
Trusts-Exercise by Will of a Reserved Power of Revocation
In Cohn v. Central National Bank of Richmond' the revocation
clause in an insurance trust agreement read:
"The right is reserved to the insured [settlor]; to revoke or
annul this agreement in whole or in part, and to modify the
terms in any respect . . . on the written demand of the insured,
the trustee shall deliver to him any or all of the policies held
under the terms of this agreement."
Held, the attempted exercise by will of the reserved power of revo-
cation was ineffectual to revoke the trust.
It is clear that a settlor may validly reserve a power to revoke a
trust and stipulate the manner in which such power is to be exercised.
2
When a particular mode of revocation is specified in the reserved power
of revocation, however, it is essential that it be strictly complied with
in order to make the revocation effective.3 When the revocation pro-
1 185 N. C. 577, 118 S. E. 12 (1923), 2 N. C. L. REv. 113 (1924).
20 Clark argues that neither the common law nor statutes deny the child a
right to sue his parent in tort and that the court should never create a precedent
upon a supposed public policy which will deprive anyone of just rights.
'191 Va. 12, 60 S. E. 2d 30 (1950).
'E.g., Nichols v. Emery, 109 Cal. 323, 41 Pac. 1089 (1895); Cramer v.
Hartford-Conn. Trust Co., 110 Conn. 22, 147 Atl. 139 (1929) ; Kelley v. Parker,
181 Ill. 49, 54 N. E. 615 (1899) ; Jones v. Old Colony Trust Co., 251 Mass. 309,
146 N. E. 716 (1925); Nat. Newark & E. Banking Co. v. Rosahl, 97 N. J. Eq.
74, 128 Atl. 586 (1925) ; Richardson v. Stephenson, 193 Wis. 89, 213 N. W. 673
(1927). The settlor may reserve a power to revoke the trust only during his
lifetime, or he may reserve also a power to revoke by will. 3 Scorr, TRusTs
§330.8 (1939). The settlor has power to revoke the trust if and to the extent
that by the terms of the trust he reserved such power. RESTATEMENT, TRuSTS
§330(l) (1935).
'Hill v. Cornwall & Bro.'s Assignee, 95 Ky. 512, 26 S. W. 540 (1894) (power
to revoke by deed is not exercised when deed is undelivered) ; Brown v. Fidelity
Co., 126 Md. 175, 94 Atl. 523 (1915) (settlor reserved power of revocation upon
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vision is ambiguously worded, as in the principal case, then the prob-
lem is one of interpretation by the courts as to whether the agreement
contemplated a revocation only during the settlor's lifetime or included
revocation at death by his will.4
The landmark case of Chase National Bank v. Tonagno,5 where the
trust agreement provided for "a written revocation filed with the trus-
tee, executed by the settlor," indicates the criteria and factors to be
taken into account in determining the modes of revocation actually re-
served. The court there said: "This trust indenture does not specif-
ically provide whether these powers of modification must be exercised
during the lifetime of the settlor or whether they may be exercised by
will. However, this indenture provides that the power reserved shall
be exercised by filing with the trustee a written notice of the revocation,
modification or change. In such circumstances it seems clear that the
settlor intended that the power should be exercised only during her
lifetime." In the recent case of Leahy v. Old Colony Trust Co.6 the
revocation provision read: "The trust indenture may be amended or
revoked at any time during the lifetime of the said J. M. L. by an
instrument in writing signed by her, and also by A. A. C. if she be
living." The court said that "it is settled that a power to revoke 'dur-
ing the lifetime' of the settlor, means a revocation taking effect before
the death of the settlor, and it cannot be exercised by a will that in
the nature of things cannot take effect before the death of the testator."
giving 20 days' notice, same to be executed in office of trustee under hand and
seal, properly attested and acknowledged; settlor sent letter evidencing intent to
revoke and took no further action, held to be no revocation) ; In re Solomon's
Estate, 332 Pa. 462, 2 A. 2d 825 (1938) (where two settlors reserved to them-
selves power to modify jointly a trust agreement, the power was extinguished when
one of the settlors died and the trust was deemed irrevocable) ; Reese's Estate,
317 Pa. 473, 177 At. 742 (1935) (where the settlor reserved a right to revoke
by giving 60 days' notice, gave the notice, but died before the 60 days had elapsed.
there was no valid revocation); 4 BoGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEEs §996 (2d Ed.
1948); 3 Scorr, TRUSTS §330.8 (1939); RESTATsmENT, TRUSTS §330, comment j(1935). i' Gal v. Union Nat. Bank of Little Rock, 203 Ark. 1000, 159 S. W. 2d 757
(1942) (reserved right to revoke by giving written notice at least six months
in advance; held, notice must be given in lifetime and there can be no valid
revocation by will) ; Broga v. Rome Trust Co., 151 Misc. 641, 272 N. Y. Supp.
101 (1934) (revocation provision was "grantor may, by instrument in writing,
delivered to the trustee, modify or alter this agreement"; attempted revocation
by will was ineffective) ; In re Shapley's Deed of Trust, 53 D. & C. 123, aff'd,
353 Pa. 499, 46 A. 2d 227 (1945) (right to revoke limited "to a proper instru-
ment or instruments in writing executed by me and lodged with the trustee";
lodging of probated will so revoking held not a sufficient compliance); In re
Lyon's Estate, 164 Pa. 140, 63 A. 2d 415 (1947) (trust agreement provided that
30 days' notice be given to trustee, same not revoked by settlor's will) ; RESTATE-
MENT, TRUSTS §330, comment j (1935).
'172 Misc. 560, 14 N. Y. S. 2d 759 (1939). For case in accord both as to
facts and law see Kelley v. Snow, 185 Mass. 288, 70 N. E. 89 (1904).
893 N. E. 2d 238 (Mass. 1950).
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In the principal case7 the same reasoning was followed as the rei~ocation
provision was said to "carry with it the thought that whatever is done
to effect a revocation must be done in the lifetime of the settlor." The
court found no language authorizing the revocation of the trust agree-
ment by will, or from which an inference to that effect could be drawn.
Conversely, where the settlor reserves a power to revoke only by
will, an attempted revocation during his lifetime is ineffective as it is
not in accord with the mode specified by the reserved power of
revocation.
8
A third situation exists where a power of revocation is reserved
without specifying the manner in which it is to be exercised. An ex-
ample of this type of reserved power in its simplest form is "this trust
shall be revocable." It seems that this would allow the settlor to exer-
cise his reserved power in any manner which clearly evidences his
intention to revoke.9
In the cases where a settlor attempts to revoke an inter vivos trust
by his will, or by an act during his life, and fails because he has not
reserved the power to revoke in the manner attempted, his latest inten-
tion has been thwarted. The remedy, however, was within the grasp of
the original draftsman. The settlor should be instructed as to his right
to reserve a power to revoke by an inter vivos transaction or by his
will. If the settlor is uncertain at the time as to which mode he will
in the future prefer to exercise, the draftsman, by clear and concise
language, should include both modes in the reserved power of revo-
cation. This would leave no possibility of ambiguity. By the use of
this method the settlor's intent as to the mode of future revocations
could be effectuated, and the courts would be spared the troublesome
problem of interpreting such agreements.
J. C. JOHNSON, JR.
Wills-Pretermission Statute-Sufficiency of Life Insurance
As Provision for After-Born Child
Under the North Carolina pretermission statute,1 children born after
I Cohn v. Central Nat. Bank of Richmond, 191 Va. 12, 60 S. E. 2d 30 (1950).
'Underhill v. U. S. Trust Co., 227 Ky. 44, 13 S. W. 2d 502 (1929); Dickey
v. Goldsmith, 60 Misc. 258, 111 N. Y. Supp. 1025 (1908).
' Security Trust Co. v. Spruance, 20 Del. Ch. 195, 174 AtI. 285 (1934) ; Hoffa
v. Hough, 181 Md. 472, 30 A. 2d 761 (1943); Lambdin v. Dantzebecker, 169 Md.
240, 181 AtI. 353 (1935) ; Barnard v. Gantz, 140 N. Y. 249, 35 N. E. 430 (1893).
But cf. Mayer v. Tucker, 102 N. J. Eq. 524, 141 Atl. 799 (1928); Stone v.
Hackett, 12 Gray 227 (Mass. 1858).
1 N. C. GEN. STAT. §31-45 (1943): "Children born after the making of the
parent's will, and whose parent shall die without making any provision for them,
shall be entitled to such share and portion of the parent's estate as if he or she
had died intestate, and the rights of any such after-born child shall be a lien
on every part of the parent's estate, until his several share thereof is set apart in
the manner prescribed in §28-153 to 28-158."
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